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Abstract
We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and em-
ploy a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms.
This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employ-
ment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement
auction, workers submit wage-bids for each job and are assigned stable jobs as equilib-
rium outcome. We compare this outcome to independent, sequential hiring by firms
and conclude that, in general, a stable assignment can only be implemented if firms
coordinate to some extent. (JEL C78, D44, E24, J41. Keywords: Matching, Multi-item
auctions, Sequential auctions, Screening.)
Introduction
“The entire recruitment market is estimated at more than $300 billion a year. The mar-
ket for executive search is approximately $10 billion annually with middle-management
recruitment estimated at more than $30 billion a year on a global basis. The fragmented
market includes many facets from MBA and college recruitment to career management,
human resource outsourcing, candidate tracking and company job postings.” Korn/Ferry
(2000) Apart from private recruitment, there is the government employment office, indus-
try matching programs such as the US National Resident Matching Program (and its in-
ternational counterparts), central recruiting divisions in large corporations and the public
∗Thanks for helpful discussions to Benny Moldovanu, Heidrun Hoppe, Christian Groh and Alex Ger-
shkov. Financial support from the German Science Foundation through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
sector. “Many large companies today spend in excess of $30 million on search fees per an-
num and this is a growing phenomenon for sure.” (Scott A. Scanlon, CEO Hunt-Scanlon
Avdisors)
Why do firms use recruiters? We study this question as the problem of matching a
number of heterogenous workers to a number of non-identical jobs in the well-known
screening framework of Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence.1 If firms recruit through a single
centralised intermediary, this matching problem is similar to that of auctioning multi-
ple items of non-identical goods to a number of heterogenous buyers demanding only a
single good each. Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986)—referred to as DGS below—
solve this problem by devising an incentive compatible ascending price mechanism for
general preferences. We adopt this mechanism to our special setting where workers face
some privately known cost of doing some job which is offset by the wage that job pays.
We let workers bid the wages for which they are willing to do a particular job in a de-
scending version of the DGS mechanism. Hence the idea is that competition between
workers drives down the wages paid by firms.
We contrast this centralised mechanism with a sequence of independent second-price
sealed-bid wage auctions, each conducted separately by a single firm.2 We show that
only a very particular sequence of independent second-price auctions is able to imple-
ment the stable and efficient DGS assignment. For this sequence to prevail, firms require
some coordination and information sharing among themselves which we ascribe to an
intermediary.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) initiate the analysis of the assignment problem. Its applica-
tion to the problem of assigning jobs to workers is studied by Crawford and Knoer (1981),
Kelso and Crawford (1982), and Leonard (1983). Sequential auctioning of two jobs with
single-crossing preferences is discussed by Elmaghraby (2003) and in a general fashion
by Kittsteiner, Nikutta, and Winter (2004).
1 This model is described in detail, for example, in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, 13.D).
2 By the revelation principle, the precise type of auction mechanism used is unimportant.
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1 The model
There is a set N of N workers competing for a set of vacant jobs M containing M jobs.
Each worker can accept at most one job. Since we are interested in the effects of com-
petition among workers for jobs we assume that N ≥ M ≥ 2. Each worker—typically
indexed by i ∈ N—has a private skill type θi which is ex-ante drawn from some known
distribution over a subset of R+. Jobs—typically indexed by j ∈ M—are ordered in in-
creasing complexity (‘task level’) T j ∈ R+ as T
1, T 2, . . . , TM . These jobs are exogenously
given and commonly known.
Workers are equipped with quasi-linear preferences over wages w and private cost
of effort c(θ, T ) summarised by ui(θi, w
j, T j) = wj − c(θi, T
j) pinned down by the cost-
less, increasing outside option wo(θi) at c(θ, T = 0) = 0. The vector of all workers’ util-
ities is u. We denote the set of all players’ outside options by O. Outside options are
not in M—elements of which we call ‘inside options’—and workers matched to their
outside option are called unmatched. The cost function is common knowledge and the
same for all workers. Crucially, for all T and θ, workers’ preferences satisfy the Spence-
Mirrlees (‘single-crossing’) condition on the non-negative reals cT (θ, T ) > 0, cTT (θ, T ) >
0, cθ(θ, T ) < 0, cT,θ(θ, T ) < 0. Thus worker i has an ‘indifference’ wage w˜
j
i for a job j such
that w˜ji − c(θi, T
j) = wo(θi) and worker i is indifferent between her outside option and job
j. Thus w˜ji is the lowest wage at which worker i is prepared to do job j. We denote the
rent i obtains from job j at wage wj by rji = w
j − w˜ji . Worker i’s demand for jobs at wages
w and the set of workers demanding a particular job j ∈M at w are written as
Dj(w) = {i ∈ N|rji = w
j − c(θi, T
j) = max
l∈N
{wj − c(θl, T
j))}},
Di(w) = {j ∈M∪O|r
j
i = w
j − c(θi, T
j) = max
k∈M∪O
{wk − c(θi, T
k))}}.
(1)
There areM firms offering a single job j ∈M each. When the job is filledwith any capable
worker, the job generates a constant exogenous revenue of w¯j .3 Firms’ preferences are
given by vj(w¯j, wj) = w¯j −wj and thus w¯j is the highest wage a firm is willing to pay to a
3 As firms are non-strategic about the type of worker they hire (as long as she can fulfill her job), alterna-
tive interpretations of our model are the market for delegation, outsourcing with centralised negotiation
and centralised (inter-department) procurement.
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worker accepting job j. Again the vector of all firms’ utilities is v. We assume the vector
of reserve wages w¯ to be publicly known.
We adopt the following mechanism devised by DGS to descending wage-prices:
t=1 The auctioneer (intermediary) announces the startingwage vectorw(1) = (w¯1, w¯2, . . . , w¯M).
Eachworker bids by revealing her demandDi(w(1)) at wagew(1). Di(w) is nonempty
because if a worker accepts no job inM and is thus unmatched, she still demands
her outside option.
t+1 After bids are announced, if it is possible to assign each worker i to a job in her
demand setDi(w(t)) at pricew(t), the procedure stops. If no such assignment exists,
there must be some overdemanded set, that is, a set of jobs such that the number of
workers demanding only jobs in this set is greater than the number of jobs in this set.
The intermediary chooses a minimal overdemanded set, that is, an overdemanded
set S such that no strict subset of S is an overdemanded set and decreases the offered
wage for each job in this set by one unit. All other wages remain at the level w(t).
This defines w(t+ 1).4
Finally we follow DGS in assuming that all wages and workers’ rents take integer val-
ues. It can be relaxed if a more involved mechanism were to be employed. The precise
information structure of the sequence of independent second-price auctions is not im-
portant since we do not attempt to derive an equilibrium of this sequential auction. All
we require is that firms are unable to coordinate on a particular sequence and for that it
suffices to assume that firms draw their position in the sequence of auctions randomly.
The following section discusses and illustrates our results. All proofs and an example are
presented in the appendix.
4 This implicitly defines a bidding decrease ε = 1which we use in the results section. Ties are the measure
zero events of more than one worker having the same type. We break these with equal probability in
either way.
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2 Results
We follow DGS and their textbook treatment Roth and Sotomayor (1990, p209ff) in mak-
ing the below definitions:
1. A wage-vector w is called feasible if for all j ∈M it is true that wj ≤ w¯j .
2. A feasible wage-vector w is called competitive if there is an assignment µ : N → M
such that if µ(i) = j, then j ∈ Di(w) for all i ∈ N . In this case µ is said to be
compatiblewith w.
3. A pair (w, µ) is called a competitive equilibrium if (i) w is competitive, (ii) µ is com-
patible with w, and (iii) wj = w¯j ∀j /∈ µ(N ).
4. An outcome (u,v) with assignment µ(i) = j compatible with w is called (pairwise)
stable if, for all h 6= j ∈M, no other worker l 6= i ∈ N demands Dl(w) = j.
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The proofs of the first two propositions differ only slightly from the original argu-
ments developed by DGS in that we use a decreasing-price version of their mechanism.
Our restriction to single-crossing preferences compared to DGS plays a role only in the
arguments which follow the first three propositions—particularly for the sequencing of
independent auctions—they can be relaxed at no cost in the DGS mechanism.
Proposition 1. Let w be the wage-vector obtained from the DGS mechanism. Then w is the
maximum competitive wage.
Proposition 2. If w is the maximum competitive wage obtained from the DGS mechanism, then
there is an assignment µ such that (w, µ) is an equilibrium and w is a competitive equilibrium
wage-vector.
Following Demange (1982), Roth and Sotomayor (1990, p212f) identify the DGSmech-
anism as a generalised Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Holmstro¨m (1979)
shows that the VCG mechanism is the unique direct reporting mechanism with domi-
nant strategies, efficient outcomes, and zero payments by losing bidders. Thus with in-
dependent bidder types, any other (centralised) auction design leading to efficiency must
involve the same wage-payments as the DGS mechanism.
Proposition 3. The outcome (u,v) under the competitive equilibrium (w, µ) is stable.
5 Notice that stability as defined implies efficiency.
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Our restriction to specific preferences allow us to ensure additional structure on the
equilibrium assignment resulting from propositions 1–3.
Lemma 1. Competitive equilibrium wages w in the DGS assignment are increasing in T .
Lemma 2. The skill types θ of workers matched to jobs in the competitive equilibrium assignment
are increasing in T .
We now introduce the concept of an autonomous match as a job whose wage is deter-
mined by an unmatched outsider. We proceed to identify such a job in the DGS assign-
ment. Since the equilibriumwage assigned to an autonomous job by the DGSmechanism
can be implemented using a single second-price sealed-bid auction, we know that the fi-
nal auction in a sequence of second-price auctions can implement the autonomous DGS
job settlement.
Definition. A jobmatch (j, wj) is called autonomous if its wage componentwj either equals
firm j’s reservation wage w¯j , or the indifference wage w˜ji − ε of an unmatched worker i.
Proposition 4. Every DGS competitive equilibrium assignment (w, µ) contains an autonomous
match.
Proposition 5. In order to implement the DGS equilibrium with a sequential mechanism, it is
necessary that an autonomous job is auctioned last in a sequence of independent, non-autonomous
job auctions.
There can be assignments containing more than one autonomous match; indeed there
are assignments containing only autonomousmatches. Hence there are preference-profiles
where many sequences of one-shot auctions may lead to a stable assignment. In gen-
eral, however, a random sequence of one-shot spsb auctions cannot ensure that an au-
tonomous match is auctioned last. Therefore, some amount of cooperation among the
firms—perhaps in the form of an intermediary—is required to implement a stable com-
petitive equilibrium assignment.
To appreciate the strategic difference between the DGS and the sequential mechanism
it suffices to recall that winners of previous rounds do not participate in the sequential
6
mechanism while they do participate in the DGS mechanism. In the DGS mechanism,
workers tentatively assigned to different jobs bid down to their indifference wage plus
the rent obtained from their tentative inside option. Hence there are (weakly) more po-
tential players at each round of the DGS mechanism than in the sequential version. These
additional players cannot make a difference to the wage outcome if they are not better
qualified than the players also present in the sequential mechanism. But if they are more
efficient than the competitors in the sequential mechanism, their presence must lower the
negotiated wages. The example in the appendix illustrates this effect for the case of three
workers competing for two jobs.
Conclusion
We show that the stable and efficient assignment obtained from a centralised labour
market cannot be in general implemented through a sequence of independent auctions.
This result is due to a centralised recruiter’s informational advantage over the individ-
ual firms. We arrive at our results using the strong assumption that preferences satisfy
the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition. This assumption, however, is widely em-
ployed in labour-market, signalling and screening contexts alike.
Appendix
Proof of prop 1. This adjusts theorem 1 of Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) to fit our
descending version of their mechanism. We argue by contradiction and suppose that
there is a competitive wage-vector y such that y > w (in at least one component wage).
Hence all workers prefer y to w. We set the initial (step 1) wages to equal the known
reserve wages of the firms w¯, so wj(1) = w¯j, ∀j ∈ M and thus w(1) ≥ y. Call t the
last step at which this inequality still holds. For j ∈ Di(t), we know that ui(p(t)) =
wj − c(θi, T
j) ≤ yj − c(θi, T
j) = ui(y) (and the same is true at all previous steps).
Let S be the minimal overdemanded set of jobs whose wages are decreased at t + 1
defined as S = {j|wj(t + 1) < wj(t)}. Similarly, define the set of jobs containing all
minimal overdemanded sets including and after t+ 1 as S1 = {j|w
j(t+ 1) < yj}. Clearly
S1 ⊂ S and y
j = wj ∀j ∈ S1 from our integer assumptions.
We want to show that S − S1 nonempty and overdemanded, contradicting that S is a
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minimal overdemanded set of jobs contrary to the rules of the DGSM. To do this, define
the set of workers demanding jobs in S asR = {i|Di(p(t)) ⊂ S}. Since S is overdemanded,
we know that #R > #S. Similarly, define the nonempty R1 = {i ∈ R|Di(p(t)) ⊂ S1}. We
claim that Di(y) ⊂ S1 ∀i ∈ R1 and choose j ∈ {S1 ∩Di(p(t))}. Either
1. k /∈ S, then i prefers j to k at wage y, or
2. k ∈ S − S1, then i likes j at least as well as k at p(t) but p
k(t) > pk(t + 1) ≥ yk (and
pj(t) = yj).
So i prefers j to k at wage y. Since y is competitive, there are no overdemanded sets at
y. Hence #R1 ≤ #S1. Thus #(R − R1) > #(S − S1) and R − R1 6= ∅ and R − R1 = {i ∈
R|Di(p(t)) ⊂ S − S1}. Hence S − S1 6= ∅ and S − S1 is overdemanded giving the required
contradiction.
Proof of prop 2. This adjusts theorem 2 of Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) to fit our
descending version of their mechanism. Let µ be an assignment compatible with w. Call
a job j underpaid if it is unassigned by µ but wj < w¯j . If (w, µ) is not an equilibrium, there
must be at least one underpaid job. We define a procedure to eliminate all underpaid jobs.
We construct a directed graph whose vertices areN ∪M. There are two types of arcs: (1)
if µ(i) = j, there is an arc from i to j, and (2) if j ∈ Di(w), there is an arc from j to i.
Let k be an underpaid job. Then k ∈ Di(w) for some i because otherwise we could
increase wk and still have a competitive wage contradicting maximality of w. Let N¯ ∪ M¯
be all vertices which can be reached by a directed graph starting from k.
1. N¯ contains an unmatched bidder i. Let (k, i1, j2, i2, j3, i3, . . . , jl, i) be a path from k
to i. Then we may change µ by matching i1 to k, i2 to j2,. . . , i to jl. The match is still
competitive and k is no longer underpaid and the number of underpaid jobs has
been reduced.
2. All i in N¯ are matched. Then we claim that there must be some j ∈ M¯ such that
wj = w¯j . Suppose that this is not the case. By definition of N¯ ∪ M¯ we know that
if i /∈ N¯ , then i does not demand any job in M¯. Hence we can increase the wage
paid to any job in M¯ by some δ > 0 and still have competitive w contradicting
maximality of w.
So choose a j ∈ M¯ such that wj = w¯j and let (k, i1, j2, . . . , jl, il, j). Again change µ
by matching i1 to k, i2 to j2, . . . , il to jl leaving k unmatched and again the number
of underpaid jobs has been reduced.
Proof of prop 3. Since w is competitive, if µ(i) = j, then j ∈ Di(w). Hence in equilibrium
every worker gets the job which gives her the highest rent at w and nobody envies some-
body else’s job not in her demand set. Moreover, since our mechanism only terminates
when there are no overdemanded jobs remaining, there is no worker h 6= iwho prefers to
do job j = µ(i) for wˆj < wj over any job in Dh(w).
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Proof of lemma 1. Suppose the opposite is true and consider any two matched jobs 1, 2 ∈
M with T 1 < T 2 and w˜1 ≥ w2. Then 1 must be overdemanded from single-crossing of
preferences contradicting the rules of the DGS mechanism.
Proof of lemma 2. Suppose the opposite is true and consider any two jobs 1, 2 ∈ M with
T 1 < T 2 matched to two workers L,H ∈ N with θL < θH such that H is assigned to
job 1 and L is assigned to job 2. From the previous lemma we know that w1 < w2. But
then, from single-crossing, player L must prefer job 1 to his equilibrium assignment and
is willing to do it for less than w1. Hence job 1 is overdemanded contradicting the rules
of the DGS mechanism.
Proof of prop 4. Since the DGS mechanism’s equilibrium assignment is stable, we have
each matched worker i = Dj’s indifference curve passing through his assigned job j =
µ(i) at the point (T j, wj). On the one hand, if a matched job j was never overdemanded,
then its matched wage is w¯j because i = Dj is the only worker who ever demanded j.
If, on the other hand, a job was overdemanded at some stage prior to the equilibrium as-
signment, then there is an intersection of the indifference curves of the equilibriummatch
for j and the worker h 6= i who switched his demand from j at wj + ε. If worker h is
unmatched by µ, then j is autonomous and wj + ε = w˜jh. If there is a match k = µ(h), then
j is non-autonomous. Thus each non-autonomous job j is connected through the unique
indifference curve of worker Dk passing through (T j, wj + ε) to another assigned job k.
The demand withdrawal of worker Dk from j to k decides the wage wj .
From single-crossing we know that each pair of workers’ indifference curves can inter-
sect only once. Since a non-autonomous job takes a crossing between 2 matched workers’
indifference curves, we need at least one unmatched worker deciding the equilibrium
wage on some job if N ≥ M . Hence there must be at least one autonomous job in any
DGS assignment.
Proof of prop 5. In a single spsb auction, it is well known to be a weakly dominant strategy
to bid one’s true valuation; Vickrey (1961). Thus in order to duplicate the assignment of
the DGS mechanism, it is necessary to auction an autonomous job last in any sequence of
spsb auctions.
Example: Consider the following example where a single worker L is best suited for more
than one job: There are two jobs 1, 2 with T 1 < T 2 and three workers L,M,H with θL <
θM < θH with preferences and reserve wages as drawn in fig. 1.
(1) The DGS mechanism results in the stable allocation of L to 1,M to 2 and the wage
profile w∗ = (w˜1M+rM−2ε, w˜
2
H−ε). To see this, let the initial wage vector be w0 = (w¯
1, w¯2)
resulting in the demand DL(w0) = DM(w0) = DH(w0) = {1}. Hence 1 is overdemanded
and the going wage w1 is decreased to some w1 = (w
1
1, w¯
2) at which H no longer de-
mands 1 but prefers 2. Since, at that wage, 1 is still overdemanded by L and M , w1 is
further decreased to some w2 = (w
1
2, w¯
2) at which DL(w2) = {1}, DM(w2) = {1, 2} and
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Figure 1: The stable DGS outcome (left). Job 2 is autonomous and thus auctioning job 2 first using
independent sequential auctions is either unstable because r1M > r
2
M or more expensive (right).
DH(w2) = {2}. Hence both 1 and 2 are overdemanded at w2 and both w
1, w2 are reduced
simultaneously until w2 < w˜2H at which pointH switches demand to her outside optionO
andDL(w3) = {1}, DM(w3) = {1, 2} andDH(w3) = {O}.Hence, at w
3, 1 is overdemanded
and a final ε-reduction in w1 results in each worker demanding a unique job (or outside
option) at w∗. In this example, job 2 is autonomous since its wage is determined by H .
(2) Let us verify that the same outcome is reached when 1 is auctioned before the
autonomous 2 using two independent second-price auctions: Start at some initial wage
vector w0 = (w¯
1,E[w2|N2 = 1, θ] = w¯2) resulting in the demand DL(w0) = DM(w0) =
DH(w0) = {1}. As before, 1 is overdemanded and the going wage w
1—which is the only
wage which can be adjusted sequentially—is decreased to some w1 = (w
1
1,E[w
2|N2 =
1, θ] = w¯2) at which H no longer demands 1 but quits the auction for job 1. If H does not
misrepresent her preferences, this reveals her true type to her opponents who conclude
that if they quit next, the should expect wages of E[w2|N2 = 2, L] ≤ w˜2H and E[w
2|N2 =
2,M ] ≤ w˜2H for the next-auctioned job 2. At the same time, 1 is still overdemanded by L
andM . Further reducing w1 to some w2 = (w
1
2,E[w
2|N2 = 2])must result at some point in
DL(w2) = {1}, DM(w2) = DH(w2) = {O} which clears the market for 1 at the same wage
∗w1 = w˜1M + rM − 2ε as above. The single subsequent second-price auction at 2 terminates
at ∗w2 = w˜2M −ε. Since this is the VCG outcome, no worker has incentives to misrepresent
her true preferences.
(3) The same is not true if the autonomous job 2 is independently auctioned before
1: Since 1 is auctioned last and we want to implement a stable allocation, we know that
M must be assigned to 2 leaving only L and H in the contest for 1. Thus a second-price
auction must result in w1 = w˜1H − ε >
∗w1. At this wage, however,M prefers 1 to 2, thus 1
is overdemanded, and in order to reach a stable outcome, the sequential mechanismmust
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offer a wage w2 >∗w2 to M . Hence in this example, decentrally negotiated stable wages
exceed the wages negotiated through the recruiter. ⊳
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